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In March 2020, a great medical exception to political and religious liberties 
was invoked in a global “lockdown,” whereupon approximately 3 billion people were 
subject to COVID-19 restrictions, according to the World Economic Forum.1 Life was 
dislocated by pandemic curtailments of taken-for-granted freedoms of circulation 
and congregation across the world, with unprecedented proportion, unknown effects, 
and an “unrelenting horizonlessness.”2 Roland Gori contends that with the return of 
epidemics, a logic of population management is being elevated over social 
subjectivities as epidemiology is institutionalized as a key “new advisor of power.”3 
Gori’s observation bears consideration as crises historically create opportunities for 
the consolidation of power as efforts to shore up precarious assemblages of matter and 
meaning include emergency declarations and statutes that suspend ordinary rights 
and guarantees, including those related to social mobility and personal expression. 
Jure Vujić concludes from this that a post-liberal biopolitical government is emerging 
around “the imperative of fighting the invisible enemy of the ‘virus’, and not on the 
ideas or democratic will.”4 
In fueling cascading “exceptions” to ordinary routines, norms, and juridical 
proceedings, crises prompt social sense-making. During the spring 2020 lockdowns, 
the significant suspensions of civil liberties energized online discussion. In this fraught 
context, heterogeneous narrative accounts of SARS-CoV-2 origins and effects 
flourished online, each encoding distinct worldviews and approaches for managing 
the virus and its effects.5 Crisis authorities represent the proliferation of social-
sensemaking as “misinformation” threatening “truth” and institutional pandemic 
controls. Yet, authorities’ efforts to present a coherent narrative foundered on 
expressed uncertainties and equivocations regarding critical issues, such as the utility 
of masks, risk of airborne transmission, efficacy of drugs such as Ivermectin and 
 
1 Linda Lacina, “Nearly 3 Billion People Around the Globe under COVID-19 Lockdowns,” The World 
Economic Forum, March 26, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/todays-coronavirus-
updates/. 
2 Nick Couldry and Bruce Schneier, “The Unrelenting Horizonlessness of the Covid World,” CNN, 
September 22, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/22/opinions/unrelenting-horizonlessness-of-
covid-world-couldry-schneier/index.html 
3 Roland Gori, “Care and Democracy Put to the test by Health Totalitarianism,” Cliniques 
Méditerranéennes 103, no. 1 (2021): 23-39. https://doi.org/10.3917/cm.103.0023. 
4 Jure Vujić, “The Bio-Politics of COVID-19 and the Question of Post-Totalitarianism,” in Security 
Crises in the 21st Century and How to Manage Them: Vol. 1, edited by Zoran Keković, Marija Đorić, and 
Jadranka Polović, (Libertas, Belgrade: Caruk, 2021), 212. 
5 Majia Nadesan, “Crises Narratives Defining the COVID-19 Pandemic: Expert Uncertainties and 
Conspiratorial Sensemaking,” American Behavioral Scientist (forthcoming). 
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hydroxychloroquine, and the safety of vaccines, eroding trust in recommendations.6 
Failed efforts at mass persuasion prompted algorithmic censorship. 
Algorithms capable of censoring “conspiracy” talk about the pandemic were 
advertised by those seeking to police social media sense-making.7 Accordingly, Vujić 
decries "algopolitical totalitarianism," described as “a simulation of imprisonment in 
various countries and beyond on a global scale, automating the repression of ‘rule 
violations’ and inciting self-censorship.”8 Algorithmic control over meaning-making 
presumes a uniform and invariant story of origins, effects and best practices of 
governance, and yet the shifting significance of particular SARS-CoV-2 narratives, 
such as the Wuhan Laboratory origins narrative, demonstrates how a once-censored 
account moved from social media margins to mainstream news headlines over time. 
Moreover, censorship of dissident expert views regarding pandemic policies and 
treatment protocols have further eroded public trust in institutional intentions, as 
observed by the nongovernmental organization, Human Rights Watch.9 
Authoritarian policing of meaning breeds resistance even while relegating alternative 
knowledge and experiences to the margins where outlaw narratives exert a kind of 
liminal force in both containing and troubling a preferred version,10  what we might 
call “the one,” following Alain Badiou.11 Although crisis communications best 
practices emphasize transparency and dialogue, in practice crisis communication too 
often simply aim to re-establish a disrupted institutional order.12 
Crisis communications don’t simply aim to restore institutional order, but 
also operate epistemically as they provide a preferred narration of crisis timelines, 
characteristics, effects and governance. These narrations are inescapably political as 
they reflect the intentionalities of crisis authorities conditioned by cultural 
expectations, as well as exigent crisis contingencies. Drawing upon ongoing pandemic 
 
6 Julian Barnes, Matthew Rosenberg, and Edward Wong, “As Virus Spreads, China and Russia See 
Openings for Disinformation,” The New York Times, March 28, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/politics/china-russia-coronavirus-disinformation.html. 
7 Shadi Shahsavari, Pavan Holur, Tianyi Wang, Timothy Tangherlini, and Vwani Roychowdhury, 
“Conspiracy in the Time of Corona: Automatic Detection of Emerging COVID-19 Conspiracy 
Theories in Social Media and the News,” Journal of Computational Social Science 3 (2020): 279–317. 
8  Vujić, “The Bio-Politics of COVID-19 and the Question of Post-Totalitarianism,” 210. 
9 “COVID-19 Triggers Wave of Free Speech Abuse,” Human Rights Watch, February 11, 2021, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/covid-19-triggers-wave-free-speech-abuse. 
10 Jack Bratich, “The People and the Public: Cyber-demagoguery and Populism” in Mapping Populism, 
edited by Amit Ron and Majia Nadesan (Milton Park: Routledge), 42-54. 
11 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007), 24. 
12 Magnus Fredriksson, “Crisis Communication as Institutional Maintenance,” Public Relations Inquiry 
3, no. 3 (2014): 319-340. 
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scholarship on expert and counter-public narratives,13 this paper represents a 
genealogy elucidating the historical, cultural, and political horizons of intelligibility 
for symbolic constitutions of the pandemic. I deploy Arjun Appadurai’s framework 
for exploring disjunctures in global cultural flows to describe historical western 
horizons of intelligibility for the present pandemic crisis and the symbolic orders 
crisis representations seek to restore and/or reform.14 Western crisis “ideoscapes,” as 
defined by Appadurai as “concatenations of images,” elicit particular representational 
frames which are articulated in contemporary “mediascapes,” rending the invisible 
viral matter of SARS-CoV-2 knowable and governable.15 Scholarship by such diverse 
thinkers as Reinhart Koselleck and Michaela Richter,16 Michel Foucault,17 and Alain 
Badiou18 elucidates the characteristics and relationships of our taken-for-granted 
crisis ideoscapes, revealing utopian and eschatological presuppositions that deflect 
attention from the politics of institutional relationships and human communities. 
These crisis ideoscapes dominate contemporary mediascapes and in so doing act to 
polarize audiences around contested crisis narratives. To re-assert the political nature 
of crisis communications therefore requires confronting presuppositions by 
thematizing the political relations among people and the irreducibility of conflicted 
meanings over crisis conditions and governance. 
 
Western Crisis Ideoscapes: Political Particularities and Dialectical 
Totalization 
 
Koselleck and Richter19 provide a seminal history of the Western concept of crisis and 
in so doing excavate an ideoscape steeped paradoxically in the particularities of 
politics, religious eschatology, and the Enlightenment world view, all of which provide 
horizons of intelligibility for the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic origins, disease syndrome 
and social effects. These authors begin with an etymology of origins anchored in 
ancient Greek meanings, which were expressed in the spheres of law, medicine, and 
theology and were rooted in the verbs to separate, choose, judge, decide, quarrel or 
fight. These significations emphasized political conflict, the exigency of decision-
 
13 Nadesan, “Crisis Narratives.” 
14 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 7 (1990): 295-297. 
15 Appadurai, “Disjunctures and Difference,” 299. 
16 Reinhart Koselleck and Michaela Richter, “Crisis,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2 (2006): 357-
400. 
17 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin 
Gordon. (New York: Pantheon, 1980). 
18 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007). 
19 Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 358-359. 
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making, and the momentousness of decisions in shaping future conditions. 
Significations of judgment, trial, and legal decision prevailed also with the Romans, 
but crisis was additionally inflected to include a “point in time in which a decision is 
due but has not yet been rendered.”20 The important take-aways from this early 
formulation are that political conflict is an inescapable dimension of crisis and that 
deliberative procedures are critical for achieving agreement on paths forward. 
The early relationship between crisis and politics mutates as the ancient Greek 
and Roman meanings of crisis were extended to the sphere of medicine, as developed 
in the Corpus Hippocraticum and by the Roman scholar-doctor-philosopher Galen (129-
99). The medical view of crisis designated observable conditions and stressed the 
expert’s judgment (judicium) regarding the patient’s survival and in doing so 
combined “objective” analysis of disease symptoms with the “subjective” authority of 
expertise.21 Medical judgment delineated between (1) perfect and imperfect crises in 
the medical sphere, with the latter designating potential relapse; and (2) between 
acute and chronic crises. European medical texts began referencing this medical sense 
of crisis in the 14th century, but the extrapolated idea of a medical crisis applied to the 
“body politic” did not occur until the early 1600s, as shall be discussed presently. What 
is key to this medicalized formulation of crisis, whether applied to the patient or the 
body politic, is that the early emphasis on politics is replaced by the authority of 
expert judgment. 
Politics continues to recede in the Old and New Testament as God’s judgment 
of His people is emphasized. Judgment “contains a promise of salvation” and 
subsequently acquires eschatological significance with the belief that the end-time 
crisis will deliver the “Last Judgment (xpigtl-/krisis = judicium), whose hour, time, and 
place remained unknown but whose inevitability is certain.”22 Within the Judeo-
Christian tradition, crisis denotes judgment in a linear temporality that diverges 
significantly from the eternally recurring cycles of the Greek and Roman philosophies. 
Time in early Christianity flows from creation to a final and divine event, the 
“eschaton.”23 Although some early believers feared apocalypse as “an imminent 
cataclysmic intervention by God in history,” others viewed the end of time as a 
promise of radical change and revelation with the possibility of deliverance in the 
form of heaven on Earth.24 Hence, end times imaginaries can be distinguished based 
 
20 Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 361. 
21 Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 359. 
22 Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 359. 
23 Delf Rothe, “Governing the End Times? Planet Politics and the Secular Eschatology of the 
Anthropocene,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 48, no. 2 (2020): 157. 
24 Rothe, “Governing End Times?” 157-158. 
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on whether they promote messianism or katechontism, where the former emphasizes 
human agency in accelerating delivery of the utopian promise of salvation, while the 
latter seeks to postpone the end time through directed human agency.25 Across 
Christian end time imaginaries, Koselleck and Richter describe a tension between the 
Apocalypse anticipated by faith and experienced as “already present” and the 
irreducible openness of the end “as a cosmic event” even while taking place within 
one’s own consciousness.26 The articulated relationships across crisis, spiritual 
awakenings and last days become firmly entrenched in the Western religious and 
cultural imaginaries, as shall be discussed at greater length presently.  
However, what Koselleck and Richter emphasize is the linear view of 
temporality that emerges in the early modern period and the grand narrative of a 
common history that get articulated around this linear temporality. In the author’s 
preface to Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, Koselleck observed that the 
collective concept of “history” was coined in the eighteenth century and henceforth 
organizes “specific dispositions and ways of assimilating experience” that reflect 
“Enlightenment reflection on the growing complexity of ‘history in general,’ in which 
the determinations of experience are increasingly removed from experience itself.”27 
In Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Koselleck 
argues for a link between the “origins of the modern philosophy of history and the 
start of the crisis which, initially in Europe, has been determining political events even 
since 1789.”28 Koselleck sees the generalized concept of history as universalizing and 
naturalizing European bourgeoisie values, especially Utopianism. 
Beginning in the eighteenth century, history gets transformed into a “sort of 
legal process” whereby the “tribunal of reason” subsumes by critique “all regions 
touched by criticism.”29 Eschatology “recoils into Utopianism” as the Cartesian cogito 
ergo sum sheds religious encumbrances.30 Yet, Koselleck argues that this idea that 
“history is open to planning” is a misconception because the construct of history itself 
is detached from the historical particularities of politics, bound as it is to 
“Utopianism” and the “Absolutist State.”31 In sum, Koselleck sees a singular view of 
 
25 Dillon, Michael. “Specters of Biopolitics: Finitude, Eschaton, and Katechon.” South Atlantic Quarterly 
110, no. 3 (2011): 780–92. 
26 Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 360. 
27 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. by Keith Tribe (New York: 
Columbia, 2004), 4. 
28 Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Oxford: 
Basic Books, 1988), 6. 
29 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 9-10. 
30 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 11. 
31 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 11-12. 
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history emerging around 1789 that is indebted to older juridical and medical views of 
crisis, but extrapolated to the social body. The social body is given a semblance of 
unity through articulation of a common history, thought spiritually or in relation to 
bourgeoisie values, such as Utopianism, but the impossibility of symbolic closure 
delivers inescapable crisis. Crisis is inevitable because of a systematically distorted 
representational system disconnected by abstraction from political particularities. 
Abstracted and curated crisis ideoscapes are particularly amenable to the political 
machinations of those who can control them. 
Koselleck’s concerns about the emergence of a singular modern history is 
generally consistent with Michel Foucault’s critique of the “Age of History,” argues 
Elías Palti in an interesting comparison of thinkers.32 However, Palti contends that 
Koselleck overly abstracts and simplifies crisis typologies by eliding counter-historical 
temporalities and the complex circulations of politics across medical formulations of 
crisis. Koselleck’s formulation especially depoliticizes medical crisis with an 
objectivist interpretation that erases politics in producing medical meaning and 
naively assumes a sort of detached objectivity among experts. Sergei Prozorov agrees 
with Palti’s critique, arguing for the superiority of Foucault’s governmental approach 
to crisis, describing it as better adapted to unravelling the power relations implicit in 
crisis identification and expert governance:  
Foucault chooses to approach crisis as a ‘juridico-political’ matrix of 
decisive judgement which could be applied in much the same way in 
medicine and law. . . after all, it is the authority of the doctor that 
permits the identification of a crisis and the possibility of incorrect 
identification places this authority in question, paving the way for its 
contestation.33 
Prozorov hones in on the role of institutional authority in constructing crisis, 
illustrating this point by describing in Foucauldian terms how the psychiatric hospital 
opened a space for madness, which was rendered in and out of being by medical 
expertise.34 As Foucault explained in The Birth of the Clinic, “Before it is removed from 
the density of the body, disease is given an organization, hierarchized into families, 
genera, and species” and this “classificatory medicine” presupposes a certain 
‘configuration’ of disease” and produces “tertiary spatialization,” defined as the 
 
32 Elías Palti, “The Birth and Death of Philosophy of History,” in Philosophy of Globalization, edited by 
Concha Roldán, Daniel Brauer and Johannes Rohbeck (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 410. 
33 Sergei Prozorov, “Foucault and the Birth of Psychopolitics: Towards a Genealogy of Crisis 
Governance,” Security Dialogue 51, no. 1 (2020): 5. 
34 Prozorov, “Foucault and the Birth,” 2. 
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techniques of medical investment and control.35 The lessons learned from these 
critiques is the inescapability of politics in all crisis formulations, especially when 
extrapolated to the social body and the historical trend toward extrapolating crisis to 
a homogenized social body while elevating expert judgement in its determination. 
Notwithstanding nuanced differences in their political interpretations and 
extensions of medical crisis, Koselleck and Foucault share the view that totalizing 
views of history that articulate crisis in terms of utopian unfoldings elide historical 
complexities and turbulence, that is, the material politics of the early modern period. 
In Critique and Crisis, Koselleck points to Thomas Paine’s (1736-1809) writings as 
exemplifying this shift in temporal paradigm toward a uniform and teleological view 
of history.36 Paine’s “The Crisis” was printed as a series of pamphlets, the first 
published in the Pennsylvania Journal on December 19, 1776, as George Washington 
retreated from British forces across the Delaware River. At the war’s close, in 1783, 
Paine penned The Crisis 13, wherein he emphasized America’s revealed moral 
superiority and in so doing articulated the conflict between the colonists and British 
troops as having derived from a “moral crisis.”37 Accordingly, Koselleck represents 
Paine as exalting America’s revolutionary pedagogy in a universalizing history of 
moral development, an interpretation grounded in the following passage from Paine: 
THE times that tried men's souls,"* are over—and the greatest and 
completest revolution the world ever knew, gloriously and happily 
accomplished. . . . To see it in our power to make a world happy—to 
teach mankind the art of being so—to exhibit, on the theatre of the 
universe a character hitherto unknown—and to have, as it were, a new 
creation intrusted to our hands, are honors that command reflection, 
and can neither be too highly estimated, nor too gratefully received.38 
For Koselleck and Foucault, a totalizing era of common history had begun. 
Accordingly, Koselleck and Richter observe that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries the medical concept of crisis was “applied to the ‘body politics’ 
or to its constituent parts,” engendering significations including a nation’s 
constitutional survival, heightened tensions within and among nations, and military 
 
35 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith 
(New York: Vintage, 1994), 4, 16. 
36 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 374-375. 
37 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 181. 
38 Thomas Paine “The American Crisis,” in The Federalist Papers Project, edited by Steve Straub, 136. 
https://thefederalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-American-Crisis-by-Thomas-
Paine-.pdf 
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conflict and war.39 Crisis derives from the political unrest of the nascent body politic, 
but is subsumed within a grand view of history whose “events” disclose historical 
processes and mark assertion of liberal rights of personhood, and whose “trajectory” 
is synthesized in a kind of spiritual Manifest Destiny. 
The early 1800s were especially fraught with crisis as this language was widely 
deployed to describe complex juridical, economic, political and spiritual issues and 
challenges of the times. There were recurrent silver, commercial, agricultural and 
labor crises. Yet, despite the particularities of politics, the political crisis of the rights 
of man was made eschatological and evangelical in anti-slavery texts of the Second 
Great Awakening. For example, Julia Ward Howe’s (1861) “The Battle Hymn of the 
Republic,” commences with the end time event – “Mine eyes have seen the glory of 
the coming of the Lord” – and emphasizes judgment: “He has sounded forth the 
trumpet that shall never call retreat; He is sifting out the hearts of men before his 
judgment seat.”40 Likewise, Eugen Weber (1999) observes in Apocalypses: Prophecies, 
Cults and Millennial Beliefs Throughout the Ages that Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851) believed in the Second Coming, considering its imminence a 
distinct possibility, and felt with others of her time that only through abolishing 
slavery could the U.S. achieve its millennial calling.41  
The eschatological and totalizing horizon of intelligibility for crisis informed 
nineteenth-century social theory as well, overcoding the particularities of politics. For 
example, Karl Marx’s 1887 critique of political grappled with material politics, such as 
the economic crises of 1825 and 1830,42 and monetary crises, which derive from the 
crises of the commodity form.43 However, Marx ultimately subsumed crisis 
particularities in the dialectical synthesis. In footnote 50, Marx distinguished the 
formal monetary crisis that is a “phase of every [capitalist] crisis” from the historically 
specific “particular form of crisis,” limited to industry and commerce and pivoting on 
moneyed capital, banking, the stock exchange, and finance.44 Marx prioritized the 
importance of the “generalized monetary crisis” because he saw it as deriving  from 
formal contradictions in the capitalist value system: “In a crisis, the antithesis between 
commodities and their value-form, money, becomes heightened into an absolute 
 
39 Koselleck and Richter, “Crisis,” 362. 
40 Cited in Eugen Weber, Apocalypses: Prophecies, Cults and Millennial Beliefs through the Ages (London: 
Hutchinson, 1999), 178. 
41 Weber, Apocalypses, 179. 
42  Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1. (New York: Penguin, 
1992), 97, 583. 
43 Marx, Capital, 236. 
44 Marx, Capital, 236. 
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contradiction.”45 The absolute contradiction is akin to the medicalized crisis of the 
body politic, resolved through the dialectical resolution of formerly incompatible 
political particularities in a totalizing synthesis, a transcendent new form of social 
organization. 
Agency also is subsumed by the imperatives of the dialectical synthesis. Yet, a 
radical disjuncture emerges between crisis and awareness that stalls the inevitable and 
Hegelian progress of history. A collective consciousness of capitalism’s structural 
contradictions is a prerequisite for revolution, and hence crisis plays an indispensable 
role in sundering the veil of ideology, positioning the newly conscious as agents of 
history. This imaginary invokes eschatological themes, which are repeatedly rejected 
by Marxist scholarship, yet refuse to be put to rest entirely, as described by Roland 
Boer, who explored the persistent idea of Marxism as a form of secularized 
messianism. Boer explains: “Jewish and Christian thought has influenced the Marxist 
narrative of history, which is but a pale copy of its original: the evils of the present age 
with its alienation and exploitation (sin) will be overcome by the proletariat 
(collective redeemer), who will usher in a glorious new age when sin is overcome, the 
unjust are punished, and the righteous inherit the earth.”46 Boer rejects such a 
simplistic formulation but observes that early French socialist thought may have 
influenced both Marx’s and Engels’s utopian thoughts about communism. 
In the twentieth century, conservative social theorist Francis Fukuyama's The 
End of History and the Last Man argues, as its title suggests, that history has achieved 
closure in the form of a (near) universal and homogeneous state founded in the 
doublet of the free market and liberal democracy.47 The historical trajectory of crisis 
has ended, the argument goes, because capitalism has overcome its dialectical other 
and promises to achieve near-universal recognition for each particular in their 
individuality. Although Fukuyama recognizes the imperfection of modern liberal 
democratic states, he argues that they constitute the ideal social form for satisfying 
the universal desire named thymos, a soulful drive for individual recognition.48 
Fukuyama’s “end of history” is indebted to Kojève’s interpretation of Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel’s (1770-1831) philosophy of history, which posited a master-slave 
dialectic as motivating historical developments toward an idealized state in which 
universal recognition would be achieved for all in their individuality (signifying the 
 
45 Marx, Capital, 236.  
46 Roland Boer, “Marxism and Eschatology Reconsidered,” Mediations 25, no. 1 (2010): 39. 
47 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
48 Fukuyama, The End of History, 181-191. 
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dialectical reconciliation of universality and particularity).49 While that state looked 
for Hegel much like the German one, Kojève felt that twentieth century capitalism 
marked the ultimate synthesis, the end of dialectical struggle, and the death of “man,” 
if s/he is defined in relation to change-oriented actions.50 For Kojève, the end of 
history is not necessarily a utopian moment, as illustrated by his deeply ambivalent 
assessment of the dangers of bureaucratic and technocratic forms of life on human 
consciousness. However, in contrast to Kojève’s pessimism, Fukuyama in 1992 
affirmed what he saw as the end of history in the hegemony of the Western, modern 
liberal capitalist democracy, described as lacking “externality,” or fundamental limits 
to its sovereignty.51 
In Specters of Marx, Derrida writes vehemently against the totalizing idea of 
the end of history: 
For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to 
neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has 
finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, 
inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected 
as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity . . . 
no degree of progress allows us to ignore that never before, in absolute 
figures, never have so many men, women, and children been 
subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth.52  
Arguing against totalization, Derrida draws on Hamlet to invoke the sense that time 
is “disarticulated, dislocated, time is run down, on the run and run down”; it is 
“deranged, both out of order and mad.”53 The time is out of joint.54 Shorn of a 
philosophy of history, crisis loses teleology and transcendent significance. Each crisis 
is therefore rendered discrete and particular and polysemous in its politics, 
challenging social efforts to draw generalized meanings from, and control over, the 
deranged happenstances of reverberating events. What is required is an alternative 
formulation or imaginary freed of a teleological logic fueled by crisis. Yet, the 
positivist responses to the problems of the philosophy of history present other 
limitations in conceptualizing crisis. 
 
 
49 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980): 159. 
50 Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
51 Fukuyama, The End of History, 337. 
52 Jacque Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. by P. Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 85. 
53 Derrida, Specters, 18. 
54 Derrida, Specters, 19. 
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20th-Century Crisis: Event-Process and the Problem of the One 
 
Anglo-American twentieth-century historians rejected the continent’s philosophy of 
history in favor of a positivist reading of events defined methodologically by 
empiricism and focused on such questions as the appropriateness of covering laws and 
the relationship between historical knowledge and evidence, with little to no interest 
in such matters as the meaning and recurring structural forms of history.55 A good 
example is provided in Robert Kutak’s “Sociology of Crisis: The Louisville Flood of 
1937” which articulates universal crisis “elements” and the necessities of functional 
organizational responses to them.56 Crisis was domesticated in the depths of the Great 
Depression by identifying generalizable elements, precursors and stages and 
developing planned responses for modeled risks, rendering crisis malleable to human 
engineering. This same formula of responding, anticipating and pre-empting crises of 
the body politic, or nation-state, informed Progressive institutions and post-WWII 
Keynesian economics.  
Positivism’s domination of the post-WWII U.S. academy encouraged 
encyclopedia-style crisis typifications and taxonomies and promoted cybernetic 
“learning logics” for reigning in the catastrophic military-industrial forces unleashed 
by modernity. Distanced in time from the experienced and mediated horrors of 
WWII, late-twentieth-century scientific institutions sanitized crisis from 
eschatological ideoscapes using precise crisis taxonomies and covering laws. 
Christophe Roux-Dufort offers a concise synopsis of two commonly invoked 
contemporary crisis typifications: event and process views of crisis.57 The event 
approach emphasizes harmful or hazardous incidents or accidents, defined in relation 
to impacts and damages and triggered by events whose properties (e.g., event phases) 
and probabilities are intensely dissected. In contrast to the narrowed temporality of 
the event approach, process approaches are temporally protracted, seeing crisis as 
tending to emerge in distinct phases, such as warning signals, triggering events, acute 
phases, amplifications, and resolutions. The observer’s task is to capture the unfolding 
complexities of crisis preconditions and consequences across time, often by discerning 
latent patterns, whose identification can enable cybernetic control over conditions by 
applying lessons learned from previous crises of the same type.  
 
55 Daniel Little, “Philosophy of History,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta (2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/history/. 
56 Robert Kutak, “The Sociology of Crises: The Louisville Flood of 1937,” Social Forces 17, no 1 (1938): 66. 
57 Christophe Roux-Dufort, “Delving into the Roots of Crises: The Genealogy of Surprise,” in The 
Handbook of International Crisis Communication Research, ed. by Andreas Schwarz, Matthew Seeger and 
Claudia Auer (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2016), 24-33. 
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Epistemological problems trouble both formulations, which together 
presuppose the event, the crisis, within naively objectivist terms. Roux-Dufort 
navigates this tension as he transforms the event approach to crisis using the language 
of weak signals. Weak signals are believed to hold “fragments of the future that, 
properly decoded, enable one to grasp the essence of forthcoming changes”58 Roux-
Dufort acknowledges that this formulation presumes a given future event and then 
attributes precursor signs to it, which seems to reintroduce a teleological imperative, 
but nonetheless insists on the disclosive power of weak signals in developing his idea 
of crisis as both accidental and revelatory:  
For the idea that signs could herald the turning point prompts us to 
make a connection between the accidental nature and the revelatory 
character of a crisis, that is, between an event-based perspective that 
views the triggering event as a starting point, and a perspective that 
considers the event as the end point of a previously unknown 
destabilizing dynamic (Sagan, 1997). A crisis is clearly unpredictable, 
unusual, and extraordinary, and is by nature accidental. After the 
crisis, nothing can be the same. It marks a turning point and, to a 
certain extent, a suspension of time. In this sense, it is both unique and 
decisive. Above all, it acts as a rift between past and future. It 
transcends the present and reconfigures the field of future 
possibilities.59 
Crisis suspends time between past and future, allowing analysis of turning points 
thought as “meeting” points between “the before, when one is often unaware of what 
might be in the offing, and the after, when one is often convulsed by discovering it.”60 
Although “inassimilable” in their entirety, weak signals help read crises and in so doing 
transform meanings and hold the potential for transforming crisis event trajectories.  
Roux-Dufort’s eloquent existential phenomenology is a welcome escape from 
positivism as it attempts to reconcile subjective and objective components of crisis, 
centering human agency in interpreting and transforming crisis conditions. The 
dynamics of his process resonate intuitively with personal experience, but the 
collective sense-making by institutions centered in his weak signals approach risks 
producing homogenized and totalizing crisis articulations that can reproduce 
power/knowledge hierarchies. Alain Badiou challenges us to interrogate that process 
of producing a unified meaning by deconstructing the very idea of “the one.” Badiou 
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argues in Being and Event that “What has to be declared is that the one, which is not, 
solely exists as operation. In other words: there is no one, only the count-as-one.”61 
Badiou’s complex philosophy escapes a simple synopsis but the point made here is well 
taken: The constitution of the event in the singular is an operation, it is literally 
created by collapsing multiplicity. A “situation” is “any presented multiplicity” and its 
order is the one, which is an inescapable social fabrication. 
 
20th Century Crisis Mediascapes and the Problem of the One 
 
The Western crisis ideoscape, constituted by an assemblage of conflicting ideas and 
images, was incorporated and curated in twentieth-century media imaginaries, what 
Appadurai refers to as mediascapes, which narrated the particularities of “news” events, 
but also re-asserted through distinct codings eschatological representations of crisis.62 
In particular, a homogeneous and totalizing ideoscape of Anglo-American Western 
history was narrated in significant part by the news media, public relations, and 
advertising industries, beginning in earnest after World War I, when radio and print 
circulated widely in domestic spaces and early film had captured public imaginations. 
In opening Public Opinion (1922), Walter Lippmann observes, in “The World Outside 
and the Pictures in our Heads,” that “Looking back we can see how indirectly we know 
the environment in which nevertheless we live. We can see that the news of it comes 
to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat 
as if it were the environment itself.”63 For Edward Bernays, the capacity for mediated 
information to create social reality represented great political and economic 
opportunities. Bernays’ Propaganda, first published in 1928, offered practitioners in 
industry and government a practical guide to deploying propaganda. His promotional 
practices inspired social engineering campaigns designed to bring about change in 
consumer habits, worldviews, beliefs, and attitudes by appealing to unconscious 
desires and anxieties.64 Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) Manufacturing Consent provided 
the late-twentieth-century critics’ update on the eschatological ideoscape of U.S. 
manifest destiny.65 These disparate thinkers explored the possibilities for common 
history to be engineered for the purpose of social control using mass media 
technologies. 
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Mass-mediated representations of history are often calculated representations 
designed to produce preferred audiences. Crisis emerged as a tool in the arsenal of 
twentieth-century opinion makers, as so brilliantly described in Naomi Klein’s Shock 
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, which explores the engineering of consent 
around crisis interpretations and policies.66 Klein is particularly focused on human-
engineered institutional crises deriving from a kind of economic and social sabotage, 
as illustrated by systematic underfunding of public health in the U.S., which results in 
organizational failures whose ruptures are exploited and managed by the new opinion 
leaders.  
 Managing crisis meanings assumed even more significance in the hyper-
connectivity and productivity of the Internet era. Despite fostering the proliferation 
of meanings, the Internet offered unprecedented opportunities for surveillance and 
micro-targeting, as illustrated compellingly by the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
which claimed the capacity to make ads more persuasive by tailoring them to 
individuals’ personality characteristics using data on demographics, purchases, voting 
behavior, etc., including data harvested from 87 million Facebook users.67 Social media 
seduce by promising to salve that burning need for recognition that Fukuyama called 
thymos. Yet, human agency online is circumscribed by platform protocols, algorithms 
and trained human judges who emerge as key arbitrators of online truths, ordering 
and reigning in multiplicity, often using crude logical codes, such as true/false and 
trustworthy/not-trustworthy, that require elaborate simplifications. 
 Abstracted and mediated, contemporary crises and their histories are 
hyperrealities in the Baudrillardian sense. Although the semiotics of meaning 
production have always been deluded by the assumption of a primary reflection (the 
“mirror” view of meaning), contemporary mediated semiosis is hyperreal in the sense 
that the requirements of reference to the real have been substituted by a self-
referential hypertextuality: “Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential 
being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: 
a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is 
nevertheless the map that precedes the territory—precession of simulacra—that 
engenders the territory. . . .”68 The Internet facilitates social sense-making, and 
narratives circulate there unhinged from the demands of empiricism. Some narratives 
were created by individuals—prophets, whistleblowers, and shills—while others 
 
66 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007). 
67 Sam Schechner, Jenny Gross, and Rebecca Ballhaus, “Firms’ Profiling of Voters Didn’t Work, Clients 
Say,” The Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2018, p. A9. 
68 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, trans, by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1994), 1. 
Nadesan / SARS-CoV-2 Crisis Genealogy
communication+1 Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Article 8
14
reflect the stories of speech communities of believers. Still other narratives were 
planted by institutional agents with calculated efforts toward propagandization. 
These disinformation narratives often yield to classical and realist tests of knowledge, 
but deflect such inquiry by their affective hooks designed to produce emotional 
identification, rather than intellectual engagement. 
 
SARS-CoV-2 Crisis and the Failures of the One 
 
Efforts to police truth in this prolific Internet context operate in binary fashion, 
coding selected data as information (truth) or disinformation. Badiou’s engagement 
with set theory illuminates the problem of efforts to bracket a singular truth: the 
constitution of the event, as such, entails a logic of unification, resulting in inescapable 
typification. Within the hegemonic SARS-CoV-2 crisis narrative, the ordering 
principle was expressed in the overarching imperative for the articulation of a 
universal account of zoonotic, or animal-derived origins, and expert, Zero-COVID 
containment. Yet, the very act of defining a viral outbreak was a technocratic 
operation occurring through an uneasy assemblage of government and private 
institutions. Early articulations of a novel coronavirus created symbolic sequencing unity 
out of viral multiplicities derived from clinical sampling and did so by assigning the 
multiplicity to a pre-existing coronavirus set and excluding inconvenient genetic 
sequencing in order to assert a singular story of certitude regarding origins. 
On February 3, 2020, the scientific journal Nature published two of the first 
genetic studies on what was then described as the “novel coronavirus.” The first study 
was led by Fan Wu and was titled, “A New Coronavirus Associated with Human 
Respiratory Disease in China.”69 The second study was led by Peng Zhou and was 
titled, “A Pneumonia Outbreak Associated with a New Coronavirus of Probable Bat 
Origin.”70 Each study separately offered ontological certitude with the genetic 
sequence of the newly discovered coronavirus. However, careful reconstruction of the 
history of the Wu publication reveals political particularities. In early January 2020 
before the Nature publications, the genetic sequence was pre-published on preprint 
server bioRvix and GenBank, an open-access data repository, by Wu and researchers 
from the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre, with Zhang Yongzhen listed as first 
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author.71 The Zhang–Wu team had reported sequencing results to China’s National 
Health Commission, but subsequently posted them online after the commission’s 
failure to act on their recommendations for control. In seeming retaliation, Zhang’s 
Shanghai centre was promptly ordered to close for “rectification” by the Shanghai 
Health Commission.72 Despite this rectification, the team’s genetic sequence was 
updated twice, with the second version posted January 14, 2020, and a third version 
updated January 18.73 Authorship of the final and peer-reviewed version published in 
Nature on February 3 included two new authors (Ming-Li Yuan and Edward Holmes).74 
On pages 270-273 of the same Nature issue, the second publication of SARS-CoV-2 
genetic sequencing appears, led by Peng Zhou and including Zheng Li Shi, both of the 
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens, Wuhan Institute of Virology. Although 
alleging zoonotic origins, Peng Zhou and Zheng Li Shi subsequently figured 
prominently in online conspiratorial sense-making regarding SARS-CoV-2’s alleged 
provenance as a genetically-engineered virus escaped from the Wuhan lab.75  
The successively published sequences detailed above stoked international 
controversy over early viral characteristics and origins that could not be resolved 
because China had ordered all viral samples to be destroyed in late December 2019, 
leaving no material traces for subsequent verification.76 Furthermore, genetic 
sequence data that had been archived in the preprint server bioRvix by the Zhang–
Wu team was discovered to have been removed in June 2020 per the researchers’ 
request.77 Although the erasure of data heightened criticism of China’s role in the 
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pandemic, documents from the National Institutes of Health obtained by The 
Intercept through a FOIA request in 2021 pointed to U.S. funding of gain-of-function 
research at the Wuhan lab.78 The idea of a primordial genetic sequence of the 
pandemic virus, now designated as SARS-CoV-2, is revealed as an inescapably 
political operation, in the sense described by Badiou,79 by these revelations. Symbolic 
excesses have precluded closure and control from the very first efforts to code the viral 
genome, revealing behind-the-scenes agendas and the global operations of 
institutional power. 
Foucault and Koselleck share the view that the political particularities of crisis 
meanings are selectively ignored and/or assimilated teleologically in relation to a 
totalizing narrative, a grand, singular truth-telling. For Koselleck, this master 
narrative delivers inescapable crisis because it has become detached from the 
particularities of politics. For example, a technological-utopic narrative of zoonotic 
disease transfer, identification, and containment was implicitly promised through the 
masterful achievements of viral surveillance and sequencing heralded by these Nature 
publications. However, this institutional narrative of control was beset by crisis as it 
failed to resonate with ongoing appearances, including the series of successive 
publications, unexplained lab rectification, missing data, and hint of international 
intrigue. Although the very definition of the crisis as “pandemic” invokes established 
expertise and strategies of governance, the failure of “the one”—the approved set—
points to the inescapable role of politics power/knowledge assemblages. 
The pandemic mediascape is a heterogeneous “concatenation of images” and 
memes whose messy representations are ordered by crisis logics of techno-
epidemiological control, even while unravelling in semiotic and viral excesses. Medical 
authorities and institutions stand in judgment (judicium), combining their “objective” 
analysis of the COVID-19 disease syndrome, origins, and trajectories with their 
“subjective” authority, seeking to articulate a unified meta-narrative of the virus, its 
biological effects and governance. Yet, expert certitude has been undermined by re-
statements and surprises, as illustrated in a comment made by Dr. Gregory Poland, 
President of the U.S. Armed Forces Epidemiological Board and Professor of Medicine 
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wrapped up inside it.”80 Therefore, there exists an unresolved tension between the 
sheer proliferation of viral meanings and the modernist requirement that crisis be 
subsumed teleologically to expert human control.  
It is important to acknowledge that the ordering imperative is not merely 
propagandistic, as it is deeply rooted in cultural imaginaries, what Appadurai defines 
as historicized ideoscapes, which play critical roles in the identification, classification, 
interpretation and response to crisis.81 Delf Rothe demonstrates this point in his 
explication of the “Anthropocene,” a posited human-engineered extinction event, 
represented with respect to a “linear temporality and a common orientation towards 
the threat of the end of time.”82 Rothe delineates three distinct discourses of the 
Anthropocene: ecocatastrophism, the most ubiquitous of the discourses, illustrated in 
work by Thomas Malthus83 and Paul R. Ehrlich84 and characterized by a narrative “of 
planetary emergency management through new forms of ‘Earth system stewardship’”;85 
eco-modernism, a cybernetic learning discourse, articulating human responsibility and 
technological capacities in evading end times through the heroic planetary engineer 
whose local sustainability projects and planetary terraforming forestalls apocalypse; 
and planetary realism, distinguished by pessimism regarding planetary governance, but 
invoking resilience for managing complexity and uncertainty. Planetary realism’s nod 
to indigenous knowledge as illustrating perfected, albeit historicized, adaptations to 
local conditions too often represents a cynical appropriation where indigenous forms 
of knowledge are valued only to the extent they can be appropriated by white people 
to “guarantee their own survival.”86 Eschatology resonates across these and other 
discourses of the Anthropocene, as Scott Hamilton points out, suggesting that this re-
inscription essentially shuts down the indefinite time of an open future and in doing 
so “re-governmentalises the cosmos, by fusing sovereignty and history back on to a 
singular pathway leading to the world’s end in planetary catastrophe. This ‘end of our 
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world’ encloses time back into a definite linear historicity – a looming end that all 
must share – which implies the end of modern indefinite governmentality, the state, 
and even history itself.”87  
The aforementioned discourses of the Anthropocene map surprisingly well 
onto the SARS-CoV-2 mediascape and govern meaning-making in predictable ways. 
Ecocatastrophism can be seen as informing the representational logic of zoonotic 
disease transfer and global transmission, while experimental mRNA “jabs” and 
boosters are represented as an innovative crisis management technology. Likewise, 
eco-modernism informs virus hygiene, masking and distancing campaigns, whose 
expert messaging and pedagogies nudge behavior with ceaselessly updated “best 
practices.” Finally, planetary realism, which is distinguished by pessimism regarding 
viral governance, can be seen in public health authorities’ expressed concerns about 
ungovernable human and viral conduct, which justify crisis interventions in local 
circumstances, as illustrated by the previously unthinkable global “lockdowns.”  
Planetary realism resonates most profoundly as it captures experts’ 
equivocations and uncertainties and the surprising presentations of viral mutations 
that have precluded containment of SARS-CoV-2 in a reassuring crisis narrative, “the 
one” of technological mastery over nature. A year into the “pandemic” timeline, these 
excesses trouble the operation of the one expert narrative of accidental zoonotic 
disease transfer, scientific/medical discovery, and governmental containment through 
surveillance, quarantine and vaccination. Signifiers such as COVID-19; mRNA 
Vaccines; SARS-Co-V-2; B.1.351 (UK); P.1 (Brazil); E484K (mutation); L452R; chimeric 
virus; Wuhan wet market; Wuhan Lab (there are three); Fort Detrick; Event 101; 5G; 
“Scamdemic;” and “clotshot” circulate virally, often in intensely abstracted and meme-
like forms . Ephemeral presentations of viral matter and meaning are ungovernable 
multiplicities resisting symbolic and algorithmic containment across institutional and 
virtual spaces. The impossibility of “the one” is experienced as dislocation and 
derangement. As Derrida said, the time is out of joint. 
SARS-CoV-2 material and symbolic excesses belie twentieth-century 
technological Utopianism and nineteenth-century optimism encoded in the 
dialectically prophesied end of History. Erosion of the grand Enlightenment narrative 
of zoonotic disease transfer and containment will likely invigorate eschatology. Bereft 
of the modernist promise, end-time crisis ideoscapes may flourish, seeing the “Last 
Judgment” (xpigtl-/krisis = judicium) in the temporal dislocations of viral matter (i.e., 
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mutations) and meanings whose unravellings can only be brought together again in 
the (one) cataclysm of “eschaton.”88 The complex temporality of eschatological crisis 
already inscribed in contemporary formulations of planetary crisis will no doubt 
energize efforts both to bring about the desired end times and to preclude it through 
radical and authoritarian means.89 The former messianic approach was pursued in 
South Korea by the religious group Shincheonji, whose name signifies “new heaven 
and earth,” with reference to the Book of Revelation, and whose leader seeks to create 
a “new spiritual Israel” at the end time.90 Religious SARS-CoV-2 messianism of this 
form articulates against scientific-medical katechontism. Whereas messianism 
emphasizes human agency in accelerating delivery of the utopian promise of salvation, 
katechontism seeks to postpone the projected end time through directed human 
agency and technologies. For example, scientific-medical katechontism articulates 
mRNA vaccination as the pivotal point de capiton; that is, as the major signifier 
securing meaning and matter against the tide of SARS-CoV-2 derangement through 
the establishment of a new biopolitical order, a new vaccine apartheid, that 
prohibitively restricts mobilities and economic opportunities. Although seeped in 
positivist philosophy, scientific-medical mediascapes can reinscribe eschatology, as 
illustrated in Los Angeles Times coverage of an emergent “California” strain of SARS-
CoV-2: “‘The devil is already here,’ said Dr. Charles Chiu, who led the UCSF team of 
geneticists, epidemiologists, statisticians and other scientists in a wide-ranging 
analysis of a new variant, which they call B.1.427/B.1.429. ‘I wish it were different. But 
the science is the science.’”91 The science is the science that tells the world the devil is 
here. 
 
The Time is Out of Joint 
 
The most concerning aspect of the homogenization of “the one” is that it poses 
inescapable problems for civil society and democracy more generally. Although the 
formal concept of “a people,” unified by core constitutional values, history, and a 
shared vision for the future, is foundational to nationhood, it is ultimately another 
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fictional unification that masks the inherent conflicts of interest and power relations 
endemic to all human societies and endeavors, including scientific ones. Following 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, it is instructive to consider constitutions of the 
people as ephemeral articulations reflecting shifting alliances enacted 
communicatively.92 Broad constitutions of the people unifying disparate groups are 
often organized by negations, as illustrated by the populist constitution of the people 
against societal elites controlling salient reins of power. Distrust of elites unifies 
otherwise disparate groups, forging equivalences across political particularities. The 
populist articulation of the people against elites is powerfully destabilizing, and elites 
will work to re-channel political affect by controlling hegemonic narratives and 
redirecting targets of outrage. Controlling affective flows is regarded as critical to 
contemporary crisis management, and the capacity to create hyperrealities 
disconnected from experience has never been greater for those able to regulate online 
access and content. However, as Foucault instructed us, control meets resistance and 
hence even the most sophisticated algorithms of control can be outwitted by human 
creativity when the goal is sharing alternative knowledge and experiences. 
This author’s findings on populist SARS-CoV-2 narratives disclosed 
increasing social distress in online platforms as algorithmic censors interfered with 
individuals’ efforts to share alternative pandemic narratives across 2021 and as news 
media, such as Politico, reported that “Biden allied groups, including the Democratic 
National Committee”  planned to “engage fact-checkers more aggressively and work 
with SMS carriers to dispel misinformation about vaccines that is sent over social 
media and text messages.”93 The apparent arbitrary shifting of mainstream and expert 
accounts of origins and mask policy reinforced counter-speech narratives, as did 
shifting rules for censorship of references to the “Wuhan lab” on social media sites 
such as Reddit.94 The pandemic paradigm of lockdowns, social-media censorship, and 
concerted media control amplified alienation and empowered resistance narratives, 
and in no area were those narratives more affectively charged than with respect to 
mandatory vaccinations. The authoritarian “jab” has emerged as both a new line of 
force and rallying call against perceived medical/scientific and governmental tyranny. 
Populist outrage expressed in social media comments on alternative platforms 
grew as institutional authorities were obliged to acknowledge growing vaccine 
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injuries, including life-threatening blood clots and myocarditis among young people.95 
Algorithmic censorship of confusing and or adverse personal vaccine experiences on 
social media, such as heavy menstrual periods,96 amplified concerns about vaccine-
induced sterilization as a component of a mass-depopulation campaign. Institutional 
media campaigning for vaccination as a “patriotic” act97 disqualified the unvaccinated 
as good citizens, while the polarizing comment by Anthony Fauci, Director of the U.S. 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, of "two Americas"98 emerging 
around the dualism of vaccinated/unvaccinated was interpreted as signaling 
institutional war against them in online discussion forums.99  Censorship of vaccine 
criticism by YouTube100 and targeting of dissident experts, such as occurred with the 
cancellation and reinstatement of the LinkedIn profile of a co-inventor of mRNA 
vaccines, Robert Malone,101 who has long studied genetic vectors,102 added credence to 
an eschatological counter-public narrative of the “great reset.” The great reset is a 
unifying trope representing a final war of depopulation perpetrated by elites and their 
mad-scientist lackeys against the people, whom are left bare without liberal 
protections of self-ownership and free expression. In a bizarre temporal coincidence, 
the British pandemic miniseries Utopia provided the great reset lexicon, as a global 
 
95 (U.S.) Food and Drug Administration (FDA), “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update,” June 25, 2021, 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-june-25-2021. 
See also FDA, “Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine.” February 27, 2021, https://www.fda.gov/emergency-
preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/janssen-covid-19-vaccine. 
96 Corinne Ahrens and Giselle Hengst, “What’s with Periods and Vaccines?” Ms., April 22, 2021, 
https://msmagazine.com/2021/04/22/weekly-pulse-periods-menstruation-vaccine-biden-fetal-tissue-
chauvin-verdict/. 
97 Bill Foster and Mariannette Miller-Meeks, “Getting a COVID-19 Vaccination is a Patriotic Act,” 
MSN, July 3, 2021, https://www.msn.com/en-us/health/medical/getting-a-covid-19-vaccination-is-a-
patriotic-act-do-it-for-your-family-and-for-america/ar-AALJRnB. 
98 Kaelan Deese, “Fauci Predicts there Could be 'Two Americas' Between Vaccinated and Unvaccinated 
Zones,” Yahoo News, June 30, 2021, https://news.yahoo.com/fauci-predicts-could-two-americas-
143800172.html. 
99 Tyler Durden, “Fauci: "There Are Now Two Americas, The Vaccinated and The Unvaccinated," 
ZeroHedge July 1, 2021. https://www.zerohedge.com/covid-19/fauci-there-are-now-two-americas-
vaccinated-unvaccinated. 
100 Michael Hiltzik, “YouTube is Finally Banning Anti-Vaccination Promoters, But Why Did It Take 
So Long?” The Los Angeles Times September 29, 2021. https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-
09-29/youtube-bans-anti-vax. 
101 Emily Wood, “LinkedIn Reinstates Account of mRNA Vaccine Inventor who Warned of COVID-
19 Shot Risk for Kids,” Christian Post, July 6, 2021, https://www.christianpost.com/news/linkedin-
reinstates-mrna-vaccine-inventors-account-after-removal-for-questions-on-covid-shot-risks.html. 
102 Jon A. Wolff, Robert W. Malone, Phillip Williams, Wang Chong, Gyula Acsadi, Agnes Jani, and 
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1468. DOI: 10.1126/science.1690918. 
Nadesan / SARS-CoV-2 Crisis Genealogy
communication+1 Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Article 8
22
elite termed “The Network” are represented as orchestrating a weaponized pandemic 
in order to sterilize and cull the global population.103 Although initially broadcast in 
the U.K. in 2013-2014, the re-release of this series on streaming services in 2020 
articulated a narrative that provided an alternative frame of intelligibility for the 
unassimilable pandemic elements pondered in conspiratorial online sense-making. 
 It is a grand crisis in the making wrought by pre-existing institutional 
inequalities, failed and authoritarian pandemic governance and a triggering agent, the 
mysterious SARS-CoV-2. A zero-COVID104 narrative logic promoting virus 
eradication through novel technologies and strict lockdowns on material and 
symbolic flows has taken hold as “the one,” coding all opposition as disinformation. 
An intervention is demanded at the end of history. Crisis must be freed from the 
reigns of teleology and, following Koselleck and Richter, be acknowledged in relation 
to political particularities. Crisis must be acknowledged to be constituted in and 
through multiple expert frameworks and experiential points of view that challenge 
the “tertiary” power of medical police.105 In “The Time is Out of Joint: Temporal 
Disorders in the Late Modern Condition,” Walter Moser suggests multiplicity as the 
antidote for contemporary temporal disorders, which are “increasingly unavoidable 
symptoms of a crisis of the modern temporality. This crisis might then prepare the 
stage for a different temporality, or rather for a plural emergence of temporal 
alternatives.”106 The plural emergence of temporal alternatives? What could that 
mean?   
Crisis scholarship can either reinforce a totalizing, albeit internally fractured, 
narrative through endless schematics of control or can alternatively seek to 
understand and help build bridges enabling respectful disagreement around the 
contestations of political particularities. Rather than taking for granted “the one” 
produced by societal time-keepers, scholarship should acknowledge the multiverse of 
interpretive and societal possibilities. Instead of prioritizing the doomed quest for 
transcendent truths in meanings and matter, many in communication studies address 
 
103 Dennis Kelly and John Donnelly (writers) and Alex Lopez and Sam Donovan (directors). Utopia 
(film). https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2384811, 2014. 
104 Dennis Normile, “Can ‘Zero COVID’ Countries Continue to Keep the Virus at Bay Once They 
Reopen?” Science 373, Issue 6561. https://www.science.org/content/article/can-zero-covid-countries-
continue-keep-virus-bay-once-they-reopen. 
105 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, p. 16. 
106 Walter Moser, “The Time is Out of Joint: Temporal Disorders in the Late Modern Condition” Revista 
de Letras 43, no. 1 (2003): 17. 
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the operations of representations, particularly in terms of their power effects.107, 108 The 
impossibility of suturing pandemic narratives indicates unassimilable excesses of 
meaning whose representations should be identified and analyzed by scholars in terms 
of those effects, rather than censored. Representations of crisis from the margins 
signify underexamined and hegemonic andinstitutional power relations. A critical 
crisis politics could be conceived as genealogical in the Foucauldian sense, as it aims 
to disclose subjugated representations whose politics simply diverge from or, 
alternatively, threaten preferred operationalizations of events, both past and future. 
Such a genealogy would examine operations of the one and trace “failures” or 
dislocations with the intent to disclose how excesses of meaning reveal unassimilable 
crisis elements that challenge the hegemonic timeline enforced through “tertiary 
spatialization.”109 Rather than ascertaining their truth status, the crisis genealogist 
interprets dislocations as symptoms of institutional and symbolic failures of the one 
to resonate with divergent expert interpretations and lived experiences. In sum, crisis 
genealogies point to failures, dislocations in meaning and matter whose excavations 
inescapably help transform the political terrain by opening up critique and dialogue 
regarding the unassimilable horizonlessness, not totalization, of our self-
understandings and political strivings. 
  
 
107 Jayson Harsin, “Regimes of Posttruth, Postpolitics, and Attention Economies,” Communication, 
Culture, and Critique 8, no. 2 (2015): 327–333. 
108 Dana Cloud, Reality Bites: Rhetoric and the Circulation of Truth Claims in U.S. Political Culture 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2018). 
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